Salt Lake City, Municipal Corporation v. Farouk Mehio : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Salt Lake City, Municipal Corporation v. Farouk
Mehio : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Tamar J. Hauge; Dan Adamson And Associates; Attorney for Defendant
Roger F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Attorney; Cecelia M. Espenoza, Assistant City Prosecutor; Attorney
for Plaintiff
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, SLC, Municipal Corporation v. Mehio, No. 880159 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/927








_.«.. IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
*7^y,TT CA 
STATE OF UTAH 








APPELLATE # M * H W i 
Classification: PRIORITY 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake 
Department, Honorable Sheila K. McCleve. 
ROGER F. CUTLER, 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
CECELIA M. ESPENOZA,#3790 
Assistant City Prosecutor, 
451 South 200 East, #125, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-535-7767 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
TAMARA J. HAUGE, #4334 
DAN ADAMSON AND ASSOCIATES, 
5250 South 300 West, Suite 225, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801-262-5885 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant FILED 
SEP 16 1988 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 







APPELLATE # 880459-CA 
Classification: PRIORITY 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake 
Department, Honorable Sheila K. McCleve. 
ROGER F. CUTLER, 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
CECELIA M. ESPENOZA,#3790 
Assistant City Prosecutor, 
451 South 200 East, #125, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-535-7767 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
TAMARA J. HAUGE, #4334 
DAN ADAMSON AND ASSOCIATES, 
5250 South 300 West, Suite 225, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801-262-5885 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
FACTS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: DEFENDANT FAILED TO MEET HIS 
BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPEAL 
POINT II: DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT ACT IN 
A DEFICIENT MANNER 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
STATE V. PURSIFELL 746 
STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON..466 
STATE V. FRAME 728 
STATE V. ROYBALL 710 
CODIANNA V. MORRIS 660 
STATE V. ROYBALL 
STATE V. HOWELL 649 
STATE V. PURSIFELL 
STATE V. FRAME 723 
STATE V. BEUL 700 
STATE V. WATTS Uta 
PAGE 
P. 2nd 270 (Utah App. 1987) 6 
US 668 (1984) 6 
P. 2nd 401 (Utah 1986) 7 
P. 2nd 168 (Utah 1985) 7 
P.2ND 101 at 1110 8 
9 
P.2nd 91,97 (Utah 1982) 9 
11 
P.2nd at 405 11 
P.2nd 701 (Utah 1985) 11 
l 675 P.2nd 566,568 (1983) 11 
- ii -
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for the above captioned matter is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2A-3 (2)(c). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the defendant prejudiced? 
2. Has defendant demonstrated that counsel? s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable and 
professional j udgment? 
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CECELIA M. ESPENOZA, #3790, 
Assistant City Prosecutor, 
451 South 200 East, #125, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A : BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : CRIMINAL NO.860076464 
APPELLATE # 880459-CA 
FAROUK MEHIO, : 
Defendant,Appellant. Classification: PRIORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This in a appeal from a judgement against Farouk Mehio for 
the offense of Resisting the Lawful Arrest of an officer, A Class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Section 32-1-5, Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City. A jury found Mr. Mehio guilty of Resisting 
the Lawful Arrest of an officer at the end of a one day trial 
held on January 19, 1988.(R. 56). 
Judge Sheila McCleve sentenced Mr. Mehio on February 29, 
1988, to six months suspended jail on the following conditions: 
1. No further contact with the victim.(R.60-63) 
2. Completion of 5 days community service. 
3. Payment of $625.00 fine. 
4. Six month probation with A P & P. 
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FACTS 
The facts when viewed in the light most favorable to 
upholding the jury verdict demonstrate: 
1. The defendant, Farouk Mehio, was charged with Resisting 
the Lawful Arrest of an officer by an amended information filed 
January 19, 1988, before the Honorable Sheila McCleve. (R. 21) 
2. The defendant appeared for a jury trial scheduled 
January 19, 1988, with his counsel, James Hawkes. Prior to 
trial, Mr. Hawkes made a Motion in Limine. Said motion was to 
limit the information and access of a prior conviction against 
the defendant for the crime of reckless driving. (Tr. 4-5) 
Reckless driving being the predicate offense to this incident. 
(Tr. 4) Counsel also requested that prior convictions of 
defendant not be introduced at trial. Both motions were granted, 
whereupon a jury was impaneled.(Tr. 5). 
3. During the course of voir dire, the court specifically 
inquired into prejudice for or against the testimony of a police 
officer. (Tr. 18, 19) 
4. Defendant's theory of the case as presented at the trial 
was twofold. First, Defendant attempted to impeach the 
credibility and veracity of Carol Jensen.(Tr. 59 - 64), and 
second, defendant attempted to assert unlawful force by the 
officer against him. (Tr. 6 7 - 7 4 and 140 - 144). 
Both of the contentions of the defendant were rejected by 
the jury and the defendant was convicted. 
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5. During the trial, two witnesses were called by the 
Plaintiff. The first was the complainant, Carol Jensen. In the 
course of her testimony Ms. Jensen admitted to a prior 
relationship with the Defendant. (Tr. 37, 59) She also indicated 
that on the date in question, Defendant and she were not seeing 
each other. (Tr. 38) Ms. Jensen testified that upon Mr. Mehio?s 
arrival at her apartment, he was placed under arrest by Trooper 
Graber. Ms. Jensen testified that Mr. Mehio failed to comply 
with Trooper GraberTs request to put his hands behind his back in 
order to be handcuffed. (Tr. 54) She also indicated that once 
Mr. Mehio was under control and placed on the ground, he was 
"thrashing about" and "flailing his legs in the air". (Tr. 56) 
She described the carpet where Mr. Mehio was controlled as 
"indoor-outdoor". (Tr. 55) Finally, Ms. Jensen testified that 
she told Trooper Graber that Mr. Mehio had a black belt in 
Karate.(Tr. 66) 
6. Trooper Graber was then called to stand on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. He testified that he had been employed by the Utah 
Highway Patrol for eleven years. He responded to Ms. Jensen's 
home to complete a police report and while he was obtaining the 
information necessary to complete his police report, Mr. Mehio 
arrived at Ms. Jensen's doorstep. Trooper Graber "heard a loud 
banging and yelling at the doorway". (Tr. 86) Trooper Graber 
then got between Ms. Jensen and Mr. Mehio and placed him under 
arrest. (Tr. 88) The defendant refused to cooperate and pulled 
away from Trooper Graber. (Tr. 88) An altercation ensued during 
which time Mr. Mehio was taken from Ms. Jensen's apartment and 
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placed in the hallway flat on his stomach. According to Trooper 
Graber's testimony he continued "thrashing around on the floor, 
yelling, screaming, banging his head, kicking his feet". (Tr. 
94). Trooper Graber indicated that Mr. Mehio refused to comply 
with his order and attempted to break free from the arrest on two 
occasions. (Tr. 90) The Plaintiff rested (Tr.116). 
7. In a unique trial move, defense counsel then attempted 
to call Assistant Attorney General Ed Olgilve, the civil attorney 
representing Trooper Graber. (Tr.118-125) The court determined 
that Ms. Jensen's credibility could not be impeached through Mr. 
Olgilve, and denied counsel's request. (Tr 125) 
8. Recognizing defendant's language barrier all leeway was 
given to him in his testimony. In his testimony he alleged that 
the officer used excessive force against him. (Tr. 136) He was 
allowed to introduce photographs of himself taken approximately 
one week to ten days after the incident. (Tr. 138) During the 
course of his examination he was specifically asked by his 
counsel "Do you have trouble with English?" His answer was "No. 
I just want to explain when I said that why;" (Tr. 145)Finally, 
in his testimony, he was allowed to describe his medical 
treatment. (Tr. 144-145) 
9. Cross examination of the defendant by the plaintiff's 
attorney revealed that Defendant did in fact understand the 
questions being put to him. At times, he did not want to be 
responsive, but he appeared to understand the questions., (Tr. 
149 - 158). 
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Cross-examination also revealed prior treatments for medical 
injuries similar to those the defendant alleges on this incident, 
(Tr. 156 - 157) and defendant admitted the he previously hit 
Carol Jensen. (Tr. 158) 
10. The case was submitted to the jury who returned a 
GUILTY verdict (Tr. 56) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS 
BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPEAL 
In State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2nd 270 (Ut.App.1987), this 
court articulated the standards of the Utah Supreme Court 
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. Relying upon the 
case of Strickland vs. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court established a standard for determining claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in State v. Frame, 728 
P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). To prevail, the defendant must demonstrate 
First: 
that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant. 
As in Pursifell, in this case the defendant's claims maybe 
adjudicated relying on the second prong of the Strickland test. 
In Pursifell, the court stated: 
We need not decide whether counself s performance was 
deficient if defendant failed to satisfy his burden of 
showing that he was prejudiced as a result of the 
alleged deficiencies. Id. at 275. 
The object of ineffectiveness claim is not to grade 
counsel's performance if it is easier to dispose them 
then ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice,... that course should be 
followed.' State vs. Pursifell, at 275, citing 
Strickland vs. Washington. 
Defendant raises five allegations to demonstrate ineffective 
counsel. 
1. That he was not adequately prepared as a witness. 
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2. That Trooper Christensen should have been called as a 
witness . 
3. That Carol Jensen was not sufficiently impeached. 
4. That medical information was not provided to the jury. 
5. That counsel failed to delve into the reckless driving 
incident. 
None of these allegations give rise to a "reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's error, the result would have 
been different." State vs. Frame, at 405. A reasonable 
probability is defined as "that sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict" Id. see also State 
v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant? s first allegation of error is inadequate 
preparation for trial. However, the excerpts cited by defendant 
do not support that contention. In fact, they support the fact 
the Mr. Mehio, despite advice from counsel, was attempting to 
provide to the jury information that might not otherwise be 
available to them. Each of the outbursts quoted in defendant's 
brief page 6 and 7 convey to the jury the defendant's version of 
the truth. 
The difficulty defense counsel was having controlling his 
client is demonstrated by the frustration of counsel's response 
to the courts inquiry of a recess. In the course of the trial, 
the judge asked: "Do you need to talk to him? Do you need a 
recess?" Mr. Hawkes response was: "Oh, I don't know if it will 
help, your Honor, if (sic) might." (Tr. 143) 
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The defendant was then instructed to listen to and answer 
the questions. He stated he would do so. At this point, his 
attorney asked if he was having trouble with English and he 
stated "No." (Tr. 143). Taken as a whole, there is no 
indication that the jury was unable to understand or weigh the 
testimony of Mr. Mehio. 
The defendant's second allegation, that Trooper Christensen 
was not called to the stand similarly fails to give rise to a 
"reasonable probability that but for counsel's error, the result 
would have been different." The deposition filed as defendant's 
appendix B indicates that Trooper Graber did not arrive on the 
scene until the defendant, Mehio, had been taken to the ground 
and handcuffed. Therefore, his actual knowledge of the 
interaction between the defendant and Trooper Graber which was 
the basis of the charge, was non existent. The jury was 
presented a version of facts of resisting arrest which occurred 
prior to the time that Trooper Christensen arrived. Therefore, 
there could be no reasonable probability of a different result 
had Trooper Christensen been called. Additionally, Trooper 
Christensen's deposition indicates that Mr. Mehio was acting in a 
hostile and angry manner towards Trooper Graber. (Deposition page 
7) It is quite probable that the defense attorney recognized 
this and made a conscious determination not to call Trooper 
Christensen and thus avoid painting the defendant as the 
aggressor in this situation. 
In Codianna vs. Morris, 660 P.2nd 1101 at 1110 (Utah 1983) 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that it would "not second guess 
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trial counsels legitimate use of judgment". For this reason, 
Defendant's second allegation of error fails to demonstrate 
ineffective counsel. 
The third point raised by defendant is defense counsel' s 
failure to impeach Carol Jensen. As noted in the facts, defense 
counsel attempted to do so by calling Assistant Attorney General 
Ed Olgilvie. The court ruled those attempts inadmissible. 
(Tr.125). Notwithstanding this, the defendant did in fact cross 
examine Ms. Jensen extensively. (Tr. 59-70;81-83). During this 
cross examination he attempted to show the bias which may have 
existed on behalf of Ms. Jensen. He also attempted to impeach 
her statements regarding Karate. (Tr. 66,67,69,81) Thus counsel 
did in fact adequately represent his client and there is no 
indication that a "reasonable probability exists that but for the 
alleged error the result would have been different." 
In State v. Royball, supra citing State v. Howell, Utah, 
649 P.2nd 91, 97 (1982), the court stated: 
The jurys determination was supported by competent 
evidence in the record and we must therefore sustain 
it. The mere fact that contradictory evidence existed 
does not justify reversal. 
The fourth allegation is that defense counsel failed to 
present medical evidence as to defendants injury. This is a 
trial decision based on the cost effectiveness of bringing in a 
medical expert. The information presented in appendix D of 
defendant's brief would not have been admissible at trial. 
Therefore the allegation of error is totally without merit and 
supported on appeal. 
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Additionally, defense counsel did inquire as to the injuries 
suffered by the defendant. He presented pictures to the jury of 
the defendant's injuries. (Transcript 144 to 146) In laying 
foundation for the introduction of this information in direct 
examination, defendant's trial counsel was aware that he opened 
the door for cross examination. Defense counsel had b€>en 
informed by the plaintiff that information of prior treatment for 
similar injuries had been obtained by the plaintiff and would be 
used to impeach the defendant's account of the injuries. Thus, 
once the defendant testified about the injuries, he was subject 
to cross examination which did occur. (Transcript 156 - 157) 
Finally, the defendant alleges on appeal that counsel should 
have inquired further into the reckless driving. This ignores 
the fact that defendant had been convicted of reckless driving. 
(See Appendix A) In light of the prior conviction, defendant's 
trial counsel made a pretrial motion in limine to minimize the 
prejudicial effect of the reckless driving on the defendant. 
(Tr. 4-5). 
This was a legitimate tactic of a seasoned trial attorney 
attempting to protect his client. Defense counsel must take 
their clients as they find them and protect their interests to 
the best of their ability. In this case, Defendant's counsel, 
Jim Hawkes, attempted to do just that. Contrary to Defendant's 
claims on appeal, opening the door to the prior conviction would 
have prejudiced the defendant not assisted his cause. 
In each of the alleged areas of deficiency, defense counsel 
acted in the best interest of his client. None of the alleged 
- 10 -
areas give rise to any prejudice mandating a different result in 
the case. Therefore, the defendant has failed to meet his burden 
of proof regarding prejudice and, his claim of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel should be denied, 
POINT II: DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT ACT 
IN A DEFICIENT MANNER. 
The first prong of the test enunciated in Pursifell is 
"whether counsel's performance was deficient". In State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2nd at 405 the Court acknowledged that the 
defendant's complaint would have to be sufficient to "overcome 
the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance 
and exercised reasonable professional judgement" The defendant's 
contention that he had been abused and was therefore the victim 
not aggressor was fully presented by defense counsel. In State 
v. Buel, 700 P.2nd 701 (Utah 1985) citing State v. Watts, Utah 
675 P.2nd 566, 568 (1983) the court stated "the fact that there 
was contradictory testimony, without more, is not grounds for 
reversal." 
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to justify the 
verdict of the jury. The jury as the triers of fact observed and 
weighed the credibility of each of the witnesses. The simple 
rejection of defendant's claim is not sufficient to support an 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
As demonstrated in Point I, there was no error that even 
gave rise to prejudice. An examination of the total record 
demonstrates that, despite a difficult client, the theory of 
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Defendant's case was fully presented to the jury. The nuances 
alleged by the Defendant on appeal should not replace the 
decision of the fact finder who fully heard this case. 
Therefore, the verdict should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon defendant's failure to enunciate, let alone meet 
the standards required to sustain a reversal based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the plaintiff requests that this court 
reject the appeal and affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this day of 
1988. 
'<Msfi-e*L—, , 
CECELIA M. 'ESPEN02 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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